Robert Vogel (talk | contribs) Created page with "{| class="wikitable" |+ ! ! |- |Date |2026-11-18 |- |Severity |reported "high" (Oracle, CVSS 3.1: 8.1) / "critical" (finder, CVSS 4.0: 9.2), BlueSpice assessment: '''critical''' (container <code>bluespice/search</code>, publicly readable wikis), '''high''' (same, wikis that require a login), '''low''' (containers <code>bluespice/pdf</code> and <code>bluespice/diagram</code>, and the AI database <code>neo4j</code>) |- |Affected | * Containers <code>bluespice/search</code>..." Tag: 2017 source edit |
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Latest revision as of 15:18, 18 November 2026
| Date | 2026-11-18 |
| Severity | reported "high" (Oracle, CVSS 3.1: 8.1) / "critical" (finder, CVSS 4.0: 9.2), BlueSpice assessment: critical (container bluespice/search, publicly readable wikis), high (same, wikis that require a login), low (containers bluespice/pdf and bluespice/diagram, and the AI database neo4j)
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| Affected |
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| Fixed in |
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| CVE |
Problem
A vulnerability in the Java runtime (OpenJDK, publicly known as "Java4Shell") lets an attacker write beyond a memory buffer when a Java program decodes specially crafted Base64 data. This can crash the program and may allow the attacker to run code. The vulnerability only exists on x86-64 processors with the instruction set extension AVX-512 VBMI, e.g. Intel Xeon from the generation "Ice Lake" on and AMD processors from "Zen 4" on. Most current servers and cloud instances have such processors. Processors without this extension (e.g. ARM, older Intel and AMD models) are not affected.
Three BlueSpice services run on Java: the search service, the PDF export service and the diagram service (draw.io). In BlueSpice 5.2, the optional AI service also uses a Java-based database (Neo4j).
| CVE | Component | Type of vulnerability | BlueSpice 5 |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-114938 | Java runtime (container bluespice/search)
|
Out-of-bounds write when decoding Base64 data, possibly remote code execution | affected |
| CVE-2026-114938 | Java runtime (container bluespice/pdf)
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Out-of-bounds write when decoding Base64 data | affected, not exploitable in practice |
| CVE-2026-114938 | Java runtime (container bluespice/diagram)
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Out-of-bounds write when decoding Base64 data | affected, no attack path known |
| CVE-2026-114938 | Java runtime (container ai-database, image neo4j:5)
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Out-of-bounds write when decoding Base64 data | affected, no attack path known |
Impact assessment
| Component | Assessment | Mitigation without update |
|---|---|---|
Container bluespice/search
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Critical on publicly readable wikis, high on wikis that require a login. The search service is not reachable from the internet. However, the wiki forwards search requests of its users to the search service, and users can influence these requests to a large extent. We consider it likely that an attacker can use this to reach the vulnerable code. We have not verified this. An attack is difficult, as it requires detailed knowledge and several steps. If it succeeds, the attacker can read the content of all indexed pages and files, and reach other internal services from the search container.
Unlike the PHP vulnerabilities in BSSA-2026-08, network access to the wiki is not enough. The attacker needs read access to the wiki. On wikis that require a login, only logged-in users can attack. |
Disable the affected processor feature for the search service (see below). |
Container bluespice/pdf
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Low. The PDF export service is not reachable from the internet. It receives the pages to be exported from the wiki. Images embedded in pages are decoded in a way that does not use the vulnerable code. We know of no practical way for users to reach the vulnerable code. In the worst case, the service crashes and restarts automatically. | Recommended: disable the affected processor feature (see below). |
Container bluespice/diagram
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Low. The diagram service (draw.io) is reachable from the internet without login. According to our analysis, it does not decode Base64 data from requests with the vulnerable code. As the service is publicly reachable, we still recommend the mitigation. | Recommended: disable the affected processor feature (see below). |
Container ai-database (BlueSpice 5.2, only if the AI service is used)
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Low. The AI service is not part of standard installations. Its database is not reachable from the internet and is only used by the AI service with fixed queries. Users cannot send data to it that is decoded with the vulnerable code, as far as we know. | Recommended: disable the affected processor feature (see below). |
Solution
Check whether your server is affected
Run this command on the server that runs BlueSpice:
grep -o -w avx512vbmi /proc/cpuinfo | head -1
If the command shows no output, the processor does not support AVX-512 VBMI and your installation is not affected. In virtual machines, the result may change when the machine is moved to other hardware. Therefore we recommend the mitigation in any case.
Mitigation: disable the Base64 processor optimization of Java
The vulnerable code is an optimization of Java that uses special processor instructions. It can be switched off. Base64 decoding then uses regular Java code. The services keep working; we found no noticeable performance impact.
Add the following to the file docker-compose.override.yml in the compose directory of bluespice-deploy (create the file if it does not exist):
services:
search:
environment:
OPENSEARCH_JAVA_OPTS: "-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics"
pdf:
environment:
JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS: "-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics"
diagram:
environment:
JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS: "-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics"
If you use the AI service (BlueSpice 5.2, AI=true), also add this to the same services: section:
ai-database:
environment:
NEO4J_server_jvm_additional: "-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics"
JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS. Use OPENSEARCH_JAVA_OPTS as shown. If you already set OPENSEARCH_JAVA_OPTS (e.g. for the memory size), append -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics to the existing value instead of replacing it.
Then run this command in the compose directory: ./bluespice-deploy up -d. Use the bluespice-deploy script instead of plain docker compose, because only the script loads all required docker-compose.*.yml files. The command recreates the affected containers. The search index is kept.
To check that the mitigation is active, run:
./bluespice-deploy exec search curl -s 'localhost:9200/_nodes/jvm?filter_path=**.input_arguments': the output must contain-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics./bluespice-deploy logs pdf diagram | grep UseBASE64Intrinsics: must show a line with-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsicsfor each service./bluespice-deploy exec ai-database sh -c "grep -l -- '-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsic[s]' /proc/[0-9]*/cmdline"(only if the AI service is used): must show at least one line
Keep the settings until you have updated to a fixed version. They do no harm after the update.
If you suspect an attack
There are no known attacks so far (as of 2026-11-18). If you find unexpected crashes of the search service (Java log files hs_err_pid*.log, error messages about memory access) on an affected server, follow the procedure in BSSA-2026-08.